IN THE MATTER OF SCHNEPF.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

United States District Court, Eastern Districtof .New York,
In Bankruptcy.
IN THE MATTER OF FRANCIS SCHNEPF, A BANKRUPT.
The lien of a levy made by a judgment-creditor under an execution from a state
court, is not disturbed by the debtor's filing a petition in bankruptcy.
The Court of Bankruptcy, in such case, may either allow the creditor to .proceed with the execution, or may enjoin him and direct the assignee to take possession and sell the goods, with leave to the creditor to apply for an order directing
che payment of his judgment out of the proceeds.

THIS was a motion to dissolve an injunctionrestraining creditors
from proceeding to sell personal property levied upon prior to
commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy. The bankrupt filed
his papers on-the 9th of October, and was declared a bankrupt,
and procured an injunction prohibiting' creditors, Cammeyer &
Mason, from enforcing a levy, which the sheriff had made upon
Schnepf's property under a judgment against him which they had
obtained in a state court. The affidavits on behalf of the bankrupt, showed that he had prepared his papers to take the benefit
of the act in September; that the summons in the suit of Cammeyer & Mason was served on him on September 17th, that after
that service he sent to them showing them the state of his affairs,
and offering them a compromise of their debt, at forty cents 'on
the dollar, telling them that he should go into bankruptcy, if they
did not take it; then oni the 8th of October, he sent again to them,
and they requested till the next day to consider it, and gave him
to understand that they would not proceed in their suit in the.
mean time; but on that afternoon entered judgment against him by
default, and issued execution, on wAich the sheriff made the levy
that night, and he filed his papers the next morning.
Daly, for motion.
K~nowlton & Baker, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-This is a motion in behalf of a judgment:credit- .
or of a bankrupt, to dissolve an injunction heretofore issued by
this court, restraining him from proceeding to sell, under an execution, certain personal property levied upon prior to the filing
BENEDICT,
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of the petition in bankruptcy. The motion is opposed by the
bankrupt on the ground that the judgment under which the' judgment-creditor seeks to proceed, was obtained in fraud of the Bankrupt Act, and by the assignee in bankruptcy, on the ground that
the title of the property in question has vested in him as an officer
of the court, and no person can be permitted to dispose of or
interfere with it except under the order of the Bankrupt Court, to
which the property has been transferred by operation of law.
The facts attending the judgment are so fully spread out in the
papers before me, and are so simple in.their character, that I can
without injustice dispose of the question as to the validity of the
judgment on the -affidavits alone. Upon that question I should
gladly hold in favor of the bankrupt if I could do so, as I by no
means approve of the manner in which the judgment was obtained,
but I do not see how- the judgment can be held fraudulent upon
the facts. It was obtained in the regular course of judicial proceedings instituted adversely to the debtor, -and without collusion.
It was entered for an amount admitted to be justly due, and the
entry was made as it was, not with the assent of the debtor, but
in spite of him. It is in -law a valid. judgment obtained without
fraud or collusion, and can in no proper sense be said -to have
been procured by the bankrupt with a view to give a preference.
This being so, the judgment-creditor, by his levy made prior to
the filing of the bankrupt's petition, acquired a security for his
debt'in the property leviQd on.
The next question arising is, whether such a securityis ifivalidated
by the provisions of the Bankrupt Act, and. upon this questiion I
have heretofore had occasion to express an opinion which I see
no reason to modify. It seems to me that such a security is preserved, and entitled to be protected upon general principles of
law, and that the general scope of the Bankrupt Act indicates
that such was the intention of the framers of the act: Parkerv.
Muggridge, 2 Story, p. 343.
The remaining question then is, as to the manner in which this
right of the judgment-creditor shall be protected. Two methodh
are open, by either of which the debt will be secured: one is to
allow him to proceed to sell the property at sheriff's sale, in which
case, as the affidavits show, there will be little or no surplus for
the other creditors; the other to direct the assignee in bankruptcy
to take possession of and sell the property at private sale, in
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which case, as also appears by the affidavits, a sum can be realized
not only sufficient to pay the judgment, but to leave a considerable sum for the other creditors. As between these two methods
upon such a state of fabts, it cannot be doubted that it is the duty
of the Bankrupt Oourt,--charged as it is with the interests of all
the creditos,-to prevent the sacrifice of this property by a
shefiff's sale, and direct a sale by the assignee, provided the
power so to do has been conferred by the act.
A discussion of this question of the power of the court in the
premises is rendered unnecessary in this case, inasmuch as the
power is conceded to exist by the judgment-creditor, and no objection is made to a disposal of the property by the assignee instead
of the sheriff. I postpone, therefore, the discussion of that point
until a case shall arise where it is argued, with the remark that
such a power seems necessary to a proper administration of the
Bankrupt Law, and that it would seem to be fairly included in the
power conferred by the act to collect all the assets of the bankrupt, to ascertain and liquidate all liens or other specific claims
thereon-to adjust priorities, and marshal and dispose of the
different funds and assets, so As to secure the rights of all persons,
and the due distribution of the assets among all the creditors.,
The motion to dissolve the injunction will therefore be denied,
and ali order entered directing the assignee to take possession of
the property levied upon and sell the same without delay and to
the best advantage, with liberty to the judgment-creditors, imfnediately upon such sale, to apply for an order directing the payments of their judgment out of the proceeds of such sale.
One of the most interesting questions
* arising under the Banktupt Law, is as to
the power of the Bankruptcy Court to
interfere with a judgment which has been
obtained by collusion against a party
prior to his filing a petition in bankruptcy, where there has been an execution issued and levy made. Ought the
Bankruptcy Court to refer the matter
back to the original forum ? It has been
held by some bankruptcy courts, that if
a final judgment is regular these courts
.annot interfere. Suppose fraud is shown
in obtaining it, can the court then give
redress ? or must the assignee seek his

remedy in the other forum?. In the case
of Hugh Campbell, a Bankrupt, ante p.
100 (Western District of Pennsylvania),
which was upon a creditor's petition to
declare C. a bankrupt, valid judgments
had been obtained and entered in the
Court of Common Pleas prior to the
Bankrupt Law. A sale bad been made,
and the sheriff had" brought the proceeds
in court. An injunction issued Testraifting plaintiff from proceeding further, "vith
leave to move to dissolve. MCCANDLxss,
J., concluded, "1after much reflection,"1
that the court had not the right to sustain the injunction. It was contended that
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Congress, by implication, conferred on
the District Courts authority to suspend
proceediugs elsewhere, and to command
obedience to their mandates exclusive
of other jurisdictions. "By virtue of
the 5th clause of the 8th section of the
1st article of the Constitution of the
United States (says the Court), granting
the power to establish uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcy throughout
the United States, Congress had the
right to do, but they have not done so."
&n the Matter of Burns, a voluntary
Bankrupt (in the same court), ante, p.
105, a petition was filed 31st July 1867.,
The First National Bank, a creditor of
the firm of which B. was partner, on the
18th July 1867, obtained judgment, and
made levy prior to the commencement of
bankruptcy proceedings. ' It was alleged
that the note on which this judgment was
obtained was given under promise not
to sue a .rit of execution, but to be held
as securi. r to afford the firm an opportunity to nake some arrangement witl
their creditors. In violation of th
agreement as alleged, and in fraud of tt.e
38th section, judgment was taker sad
levy made. But. before the date fixed
by the .sheriff to sell, the court granted
an injunction staying the sheriff from.
proceeding, directing him to deliver the
property to assignee in bankruptcy.
Counsel for the bankrupt argued, that
the court was bound to interfere by injunction because the judgment was not
valid. MOCANDLESS, J., said: "If it
is fraudulent or void under the bankrupt
law it is the province of the assignee in
bankruptcy, who stands in the attitude
of a defendant, to see in that forum that
no injustice is done to the general creditors," and referred it to the state court.
Thus the judge held, even if the judgment was obtained by fraud on the act,
that the bankruptcy court could not interfere, and the assignee must seek his
remedy in the state court. Is this opinion the true rule, and in such a case

cannot. the bankruptcy court givi a
remedy? Does not fraud vitiate all
contracts and proceedings, and if a judgment be obtained through fraud on the
bankrupt law-being void ab initio-must the bankruptcy court send the assignee to the other forum ? Should not
this court examine into the question, and
thus save circuity of action and embarrassment ? In the case of Irving v.
Hughes, argued before GinER and. CAnWALADER, JJ., in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, -post p. 209, it was
held, that bankruptcy courts have no
supervisory jurisdictions over proceedings of the state courts: Act March 2d
1793. But the litigant in it may be restrained from doing what would frustrate
or directly impede the jurisdiction expressly conferred by the bankruptcy act:
7"Howard 6f2; 4 Cranch 179. The
bankruptcy court ought to have the
power to act in such cases. And have
they not? The judge, in CampbellVs
'ase, says: " The bankrupt law coniers no authority on this court t6 restrain
proceedings therein (i. e., in state courts)
by injunction or other process-" The
court, in the above case of Francis
Schnepf, did not go so far, nor do we
ibelieve any other court has yet taken so
broad grounds. But in "Scmepf's Case
the court sayps -"I should gladly hold
in favor of the bankrupt if I could do
so, as I by no means approve of the
manner in which the judgment was obtained, -but I do not see how the judg
ment can be, held fraudulent upon the
facts-it was obtained in the regular
course of judicial proceedings instituted
adversely to the debtor and without collusion." From this ruling' it would
seem, that hadfraud been clearly shown,
as it was attempted to be shown, tne
court would doubtless have compelled
the judgment-creditor to take pro rata
with the othtr creditors. That would
seem the wiser course, and in accord.
ance with the spirit of the law.
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Thus, in the case of Metzler and
Cowperthwaite (in the Southern District
of New York), reported in 6 Int. Rev.
Record, p. 74, BLAT'CH"ORD, J., refused to dissolve an injunction restraining judgment-creditors from proceeding
on an execution and levy obtained previous to commencement of bankruptcy
proceedings. In the case of Henry
Bernstein (same court), 6 Int. Rev.
Record 222, where there was nothing
shown to impeach the bona tides of the
judgment execution and levy, the sheriff
having sold the property levied on, it
was held the sheriff could apply the proceeds of the property sold towards the
discharge of the amount which he is required by the execution to make, and
pay the overplus to the assignee, if one,
and, if none, then to the clerk of bankruptcy court, to the credit of the bankrupt. But if there had been something
shown to impeach the bona fides, the
court would have ruled otherwise. No
lien by a creditor (see 20), gives him
a preference except a lien by mortgage.
In the matter of Benjamin F. Jfetcalf
and Samuel Duncan, bankrupts, reported
in vol. 6 Int. Rev. Record, p. 223, in the
Eastern District of New York, which
arose upon a petition filed by Buckman,
for relief from an injunction issued by
the court restraining all proceedings in
a cause pending in the Court of Appeals
of the state of New York, wherein the
petitioner was plaintiff, and one of the
bankrupts defendant, the case was tried
and judgment given for plaintiff, which
was appealed from. One of the securities upon appeal, having become
insolvent, the. plaintiff, after the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings,
gave notice of motion to- compel the
bankrupt to furnish new security or
abandon hiq appeal, whereupon the
bankrupt obtained from this court, in
whien I.Is petition in bankruptcy had
been fi]. i. an injunction staying all
proceediv-'s, which injunction the plain-

tiff in that cause moved to have dismissed. BENEDICT, J., in delivering
the opinion of the court, after 1 eferring
to sec. 21 of the bankrupt act, and stating its object to be to prevent a race of
diligence between creditors, and to protect the bankrupt from being harassed
with suits pending the question of discharge, says : "My opinion, therefore,
is, that it-is the clear duty of this court
to maintain this injunction heretofore
granted against the petitioners until the
bankrupt shall have had a reasonable
time to obtain his discharge. What
effect the discharge. if obtained, will
have upon the proceedings pending in
the state court I do not undertake to decide. The motion must be denied.".
The opinion in this case follows in the
wake of the cases of Bernstein, Schnepf,
Metzler and Cowopertlaoaite, and others
cited, but in effect opposed to the decisions in Campbell's and Burns' cases.
In the case of Russel v. Cheatam, 8 S.
& M. Rep. 703, it is. held, that the state
courts must be governed by the construdtiou given to the Bankrupt Act by
the Courts of the United States.
And by the case, Clarke v. Rist, 4
McLean 494, it was held, wherd .creditors are proceeding in a state court to
enforce liens on the property of the bankrupt, the Circuit Court would take jurisdiction of a bill for injunction on them
if fraud be alleged.
. The ruling in the cases of Campbell
and Burns seems contrary to the provisions" of the I st section of the Bankrupt
Law, which provides among other things,
that " the jurisdiction of the court shall
extend to all cases and controversies
arising betyween the bankrupt and any
creditors, who shall claim any debt or
demand under the bankruptcy.; to the
collection of all the assets of the bankrupt; to the ascertriment ana liquidation of the liens, and other specific claims
thereon ; to the adjuntment of the various
priorities and conflicting interests of all
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parlies, and to all acts, matters and
things to be done under and in virtue
of the bankruptcy." Also (sect. 15)
provides, that the assignee shall demand
-ind receive from all persons holding the
,ame the estate assigned or intended to
be assigded. Can it be contended in
view of these express provisions that
goods levied on, after a judgment has
I)cen
obtained by fraud, are not one of
the estates intended to be assigned ?
Statutes are to be construed liberally in
furtherance of the general object, both
with reference to the act itself and the
remedy: Beekman v. Wilson, 9 Met. 438.

We conceive the intent and genis of
the Bankrupt Law to be, to give an
equitable and just division-ex tequo et
bono-of the bankrupt's property to- all
interested that they take a pro rata share.
Hence, the law provides (sect. 39)
against all schemes for giving preference by or against a person who is in
fact insolvent, and makes any such
attempt an act of bankruptcy. Cases
will soon arise which will present the
question, whether in a case where judgments anre obtained by fraud the Bankruptcy Court can interfere squarely
before them.
J. F. B.1

Circuit Court 'ofthe U'nited States. Eastern District-ofPenn.
8y/vania. ' In Equity. .actober Session, 1867.
JAMES IRVING v. THOMAS HUGHES.
In a case of involuntary bankruptcy inr
which the debtor, being insolvent, or,
having insolvency in contemplation, and- intending to give a preference, or to
defeat or delay the operation of the Bankrupt Law, has, within six months before
the commencement oif the proceedings in bankruptcy, given to a creditor who had
reasonable cause to believe that a fraud on this law ivas intended, or that the
debtor was insolvent, a warrant of attorney under which judgnent has been, confessedin a state c6urt, and an execution has been levied upon his stock in,
trade.
which has nokas yet been s9ld underit, the present Bankrupt Law givesto the'
courts of the United States for the proper judicial district, jurisdiction to. pfohibit
such creditor, by injunction, from proceeding further Undter such execution.
The District Court, instead of issuing such an injunction under the sumjnAry
jurisdiction in bankruptcy, may refuse tA consider the subject unless under a distinct auxiliary proceeding in equity against such a crbditor. The bill at the suit
of the petitioning or any intervening creditor, may then be prosecuted in the Circuit Court on behalf of the general body of creditors, until the assignment in
bankruptcy, after which the assignee may be substituted or added as a complainant; and if the proceedings in bankruptcy are duly prosecuted, a preliminaTy
injunction issued by the Circuit Court may, in a proper case, be continued aftcr
answer, under such conditiong as will preserve the priority of the creditor thus
restrained if the lien of his execution should ultimately be established.
THIS was a

bill in equity, under sect. 2 of the Bankrupt Act,

I In giving place to the foregoing note by an esteemed contributor, we desire to
repeat that we do not commit the Law Register to any particular line of opinion.
bat hold its pages open to any well-stated view of any professional topic.-ED. A.
L. R.
VOL. XVI-14

IRVING v. HUGHES.

for an injunction in aid of proceedings in bankruptcy.
The
plaintiff was the petitioning creditor in the Court of Bankruptcy,
to have one declared an involuntary bankrupt. The
defendant was also a creditor of -,
and had entered a judgment against the latter in a state court, on a warrant of attorney,
given within six months of the commencement of the proceedings
in bankruptcy, upon which judgment an execution had been
issued and a levy made. This was a bill to restrain him from
proceeding further on his judgment. A preliminary injunction
was granted, whereupon the defendant filed his answer, setting
forth the facts, and moved to dissolve the injunction.'
Longstreth and Townsend, for the motion.-The court has no
jurisdiction. The 2d section of the Bankrupt Act, which confers
jurisdiction on the Circuit Court, excepts cases for which special
provision is otherwise mad'e, and the case is within'the exception
because the 40th section gives a summary jurisdiction to the
District Court in bankruptcy to restrain, by injunction, the
debtor, and any other person, from making any transfer or dispoI In

several: cases of involuntary 'bankruptcy in this district, the alleged act

of bankruptcy" has been that, under a warrant of attorney, given within six
months by the alleged bankrupt, judgment against him has been ehtered at the
suit of a favored creditor in the state court and an execution levied upon the stock
in trade of the defendant, who (it is alleged) gave the warrant, or procured the
levy to be made, when he, with such plaintiff's knowledge, was insolvent, or pontemplated insolvency, and that the intent was to give a preference, or to defeat or
delay the operation of the Bankrupt Law; this alternative intent being usually,
in the proper language of pleading, alleged conjunctively, as a twofold intent.
In these cases, unless the property levied on has been already sold, under "the
execution, the petitioning creditor, upon obtaining the preliminary .order on the
debtor to show cause'against the adjudication of bankruptcy, has usually asked
of the District Court an injunction prohibiting the judgment-creditor from proceeding further under his execution in the state court. The District Court has
uniformly refused to grant such a preliminary injunction without a previous citation of the execution-creditor; and, upon the return of such citation, has given
to him the option of requiring the petitioning-creditor to proceed by bill in the
Circuit Court under the auxiliary jurisdiction conferxed as above by the Bankrupt
Law. When the urgency has been too great to abide the returu of a citation, the
District Court has required the petitioning-creditor to proceed, at all events, in the
first instance, by bill in the Circuit Court. Preliminary injunctions have been
granted upon such bills, with a saving to the party enjoine.d of flis lien if its
priority should afterwards be established either under the proceedings in bakruptcy, or in the suit in equity. The court has rem.arked that after the appointment of an assignee in bankruptcy, the proceeding in equity could not be continued.
except under a supplemental bill at his suit.
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sition of the debtor's property, and from any interference with it.
Nor is there any jurisdiction under section 40, as that section
applies only to the period anterior to the return of the order to
show cause. They also cited the cases of Campbell and Burns,
in the Western District of Pennsylvania, Am. Law Reg., Dec.
1867, ante, pp. 100, 105.
Speakman, for the plaintiff, against the motion.-The summary
jurisdiction. specially conferred by the 40th section is not co.
extensive with the exigency of the cases in which an injunction
may be necessary; this summary jurisdiction is perhaps limited
to cases of restraint of the alleged bankrupt's own agents or
other persons in immediate privity or association with him, and
is, at all events, in terms, expressly limited to the interval
between the issuing and the return of the order to show cause.
It is suggested that formerly, under the Bankrupt Law of 1841, a
question had arisen whether the prohibition of the Act of 2d
March 1793. § 5, to grant an injiinction without previous notice,
applied to a proceeding in equity in aid of the jurisdiction in
bankruptcy, and that the 40th section of the present Bankrupt
Law, in the enactment now in question, resolves this doubt by
allowing the injunction without previous notice, for this interval
of time between the issuing and the return of the order to show
cause.
The Court, GRIER anll CADWALADER, JJ., were of opinion'
they had jurisdiction, saying: The cases in bankriupfcy in the
Western District are inapplicable. The language used in them
should be understood according to their subject-matter.
The
Sase principally relied on was one of voluntary bankruptcy involving a question which the court of the state was considered by the
judge fully competent to decide. Here, on the 'contrary, the
4luestion is not fully cognisable under the jurisprudence or legislation of the state. The courts of the state certainly cannot, in
all cases, enforce the adversary rights of the general creditors
under an involuntary bankruptcy. The jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States does not here depend upon the provision of
the 40th section of the present Bankrupt Law. This provision
does indeed impliedly recognise the jurisdiction. But the previous enactments of other sections confer it. The provision of
the 40th section applies only to the primary stage of the proceed.
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ings. In that stage, it dispenses with conditions and formalities
w hich must otherwise have been fulfilled and observed.
As
against what parties other than the alleged bankrupt, it has thus
dispensed with them, need not be considered, because the present
proceedings in this court, if in proper form, cannot be irregular.
Under the former English jurisdiction in bankruptcy, the chancelor would refuse to proceed otherwise than upon a bill, where
he thought proper thus to afford an opportunity to appeal from
his decision. The present Bankrupt Law of the United States
gives to this court, in addition to its revisory jurisdiction, an
'auxiliary jurisdiction which may sometimes be so exercised as to
secure the benefit of an appeal from the District Court without
the delay and expense.
These courts have no supervisory jurisdiction over proceedings,
of the state courts. In each of the cases reported in 4 Cranch
179, and T How. 612, 625, the court of the state had 'full cognisance of the subject of controversy, and of all its proper incidents;
and, in the case in 7 Howard, the subject was not peculiarly cognisable under proceedings in bankruptcy. In such a case, to
6njoin the .plaintiff in the state court, would, in effect, have been
.to enjoin that court, which the Act of 2d March 1793 had prohibited.
But, in the present case, if the act of 1793 would
otherwise have been applicable, the present Bankrupt Law would
exclude its application so far as the present question is concerned.
The state court cannot be enjoined. But the litigant in it -may
be restrained from doing what would frustrate, or directly impede,
the jurisdiction expressly conferred by the Bankrupt Act.
The jurisdiction having thus been established, the argument
of the motion to dissolve the injunction was heard in the Circuit
Court, on bill.and answer, by the-District Judge (CADWALADER),
sitting alone. He said, as to the jurisdiction,' that although he
bad exercised it very cautiously, and would continue to do so,
he had never doubted its existence, and' that he had asked the
attendance of the Circuit Judge merely in order that any doubts
of others might be quieted.
In the present case, the motion was refused, and the injunction
continued, but modified so as to save the lien -of the defendant
when the goods should be sold and the money realized.

EX PARTE DONALDSON.

District Court of the United States in Bankruptcy, Bastern
District of Pennsylvania. August 31, 1867.
EX PARTE DONALDSON.'
An unimpugned creditor's lien having, before the commencement of voluntary
proceedings in bankruptcy, attached upon part of the bankrupt's estate, no consideration of probable sacrifice of the subject of the lien under judicial proceedhigs for its enforcement in a state court, will induce a court of the United States
to restrain, delay, or hinder the creditor from prosecuting them. No equity of the
-general body of the bankrupt's creditors can be.asserted for their common, equal
benefit, on the mere ground of doubtfulness of his title to the subject of the lien
and the danger of consequent sacrifice at a forced sale. Qucere, whether such an
equity can be asserted on their behalf in any case without such a payment of his
demand as may substitute tha assignee in bankruptcy for him as to the lien.

A PETITION is this day presented by a voluntary bankrupt whose
original petition for adjudication and relief was filed on the 6th
of the present month. He .was adjudged a bankrupt by the register on the 12th, when a warrant was issued appointing the first
meeting of creditors for 16th of September next. The present
petitiot referring to a judgment obtained in April last under
adversary proceedings against the petitioner, and to-an execution
under it, asserts that real estate already sold by the sheriff under
this execution is alleged by the plaintiff to bd the petitioner's, but
is denied by. the petitioner to be his property. Having been
advised that should it ultimately be determined to be his property,it "should go to the behefit of all his creditors in bankruptcy,"he presents this petition. The sheriff's dqed of conveyance had
not been acknowledged. The prayer is 'for an injunction to
restrain the plaintiff from proceeding further on-the judgment and
execution, '"and from having the deed for said property acknowledged by the sheriff." The petition does not expressly state that
the plaintiff is the purchaser.
Parsons,for the petitioner, urged the hardship of permn itting
such a sale, under a doubtful title, to be made, as it must inevitably be at a sacrifice.' He submitted to the court the question
whether it would not be proper to interfere for the protection of
the general body of the creditors. He referred to the case of
Reed, a bankrupt, on whose petition Judge BLATOHFORD, in the
I We are indebted for this case to the Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer.-ED.
A. L. R.
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District Court of the Southern District of New York, had, by
injunction, restrained a plaintiff in a. judgment and execution
against the bankrupt in the Supreme Court of New York from
proceeding with an examination of him as a judgment-debtor in
that court under a law of the state.
Opinion by
OADWALADER, J.-The case before Judge BLATOHFORD which
has been cited has no apparent applicability. There was no question of an existing lien of whose fruits the creditor holding it was
to be deprived. Here the equity of the general body of creditors
might be to require the proceedings against the land in question
to be for common benefit subject to the lien of the judgmentcreditor. But in asserting this equity, the general creditors must.
not frustrate the right of the -judgment-creditor to his lien. 'If
there was any probability of a proceeding for common benefit at
the suit either of the future assignee, or of a provisional assignee,
to establish the title of the bankrupt's general creditors to the
land subject to the judgment-creditors' lien, I might under some
circumstances, restrain' him from selling, in thermean time, at a
sacrifice under his execution.. This woild be a jurisdiction to
exercise with great caution ; and might in some cases perhaps be
exercisable under a bill in equity in aid of the proceedings in
bankruptcy, rather than under these proceedings themselves.
'Ihe case may stand. over for further consideration. In'the
mean time, if reason be shown, I may appoint a receiver to act as
provisional assignee until the complete qualification of. an assignee
under the provisions of the Act of Congress. Such an assignee could
inform himself as.to the'true interests of the gener&l body of
creditors. If a mode can be suggested of promoting their inte.
rests without other injury to the judgment-creditor than mere
delay until a decision upon the title of the bankrupt, an injunction might possibly be proper. But under what circumstances
this might thus be proper, cannot be suggested beforehand.

The foregoing opinion .having been filed, the judge added : My
last remarks are made only because I do not wish to preclude
further argument if it should be desired. At present,'I do not
see how I can possibly interfere unless upon an offer on the part
of the general creditors to make such payment of the judgment
creditor's demand as may substitute the assignee in bankruptcy
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for him as to the lien of the judgm-ent; nor how even this can be
done after an actual sale by the sheriff, though the purchaser's
title may not have been consummated. I do not pause to consider
whether the bankrupt is the party who should have presented the
petition if it were otherwise a proper one. Perhaps before assignment, it may, under this Act of Congress, be necessary in some
cases to allow him to make certain applications which, after
assignment, would be more proper on the part of the assignee.
The matter was not afterwards moved.

Court of Appeals of New York.
JOHN' B. TREVOR ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. JOHN WOOD ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.
from each other agree to communicate by
a
distance
at
residing
Where parties
telegraph in their blasiness transactions, the same rules apply in determining
whether a contract has been- made as in cases of communications by letter.
Therefore, an offer accepted by telegraph constitutes a contract, although the
party making the qffer attempts to revoke it before his receipt of the acceptance.
An acqeptance by letter of an offer is sufficient to make a contract, not by virtue of being sent through the public mail, but because it is an overt act manifesting the intention of the acceptor, and- thus making the aggregatio nentiuia which

is the essence of a contract. Per

SCRUGHAH,

J-

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme' Court, rendered at

General Termin the First District, reversing a judgment entered
upon'the report of Hon. William Mitchell, referee, and orderinga new trial before the same referee.
The appellants have stipulated that if the judgmenf be affirmed,
judgment absolute may be entered against them.
The appellants are dealers in bullion in New York, and- the
respondents are dealers in bullion in New Orleans. In 1859 they
agreed to deal with each other in the purchase and sale of dollars,
and that all communications between them in reference to such
transactions should be by telegraph.
On 30th January 1860, the appellants telegraphed from New
York, to the respondents, at New Orleans, asking at what price
they would sell one hundred thousand Mexican dollars. On 31st of
the same month the respondents answered that they would deliver
fifty theusand at seven and one-fourth, and on the same day the
appellants telegraphed from New York, to the defendants at New
Orleans, as follows"
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"To John Wood & Co.: Your offer fifty thousand Mexicans
at seven and one-quarter accepted ; send moife, if you can.
" TREVOR1 & COLGATE."

At the same time the appellants sent by mail to the respond
ents, a letter acknowledging the receipt of the respondents' tele.
gram, and copying the appellants' telegraphic answer. On the
same day the respondents had also sent by mail a letter to the
appellants, copying respondents' telegram of that date. -On the
next day (1st February 1860), the appellants again telegraphed
to the respondents as follows :
"To John Wood & Co.: Accepted'by telegraph yesterday
your qffer for fifty thousand Mexicans; send as many more, same
price. Reply.
TREVOR & COLGATE."
This telegram, as well as that of 31st of January, from the
appellants, did not reach the respondents hntil 10 A. M,, on 4th
February 1860,'in consequence'of some derangement in a part
of the line used by the appellants, but which was not known to
the appellants until 4th February, when the telegraph company
reported the line down.
On 3d February the respondents
telegraphed' to the appellants as follows: " No- answer to our
aespatch--dollars are sold ;" and on .the same day they wrote by
mail to the same effect. The appellants received this despatch
on the same day, and answered it on the same. day, as follows:
"To John Wood & Co.: Your offer was accepted on recei't ;"
and again the next day, "1The dollars must come, or we will
hold you responsibie'.
Reply.
TREVOR & COLGATE;" and
again, on .4th February, insisting on the dollars being Sent
"by this or next steamer," and saying, " Don't fail to send the
dollars at any price." On the same 4th February, the respondents telegraphed to appellants, "I No dollars to be had. We may
ship by steamer, twelfth, as 'you proposed, if we have them."
No dollars were sent, and this action was brought to recover
damages for an alleged breach of contract in not delivering them.
The referee found for plaintiff $219.33,'but'the Supreme Court,
at General Term, reversed this and entered judgment for . the
defendants.
ScRUuAM, J.-The offer of the respondents vas made on the
31st January, and they did not attempt to revoke it until the 3d
of February. The offer was accepted by the appellants before,

TREVOR v. WOOD.

but the respondents did not obtain knowledge of the acceptance
until after this attempted revocation. The principal question,
herefore, which arises in the case is, whether a contract was
created by this acceptance, before knowledge of it reached the
xespondents.
The case of HMactier v. Prith, in the late Court of Errors, (6
Wend. 103), settles this precise question, and was so regarded by
this court in Vassar v. Cainp, 1 Kern. 441, where it is said that
the principle established in the case of Mdctier v. Prithwas," that it was only necessary that theie should be a concurrence
:f the minds of the parties upon a distinct propositionmanifested
by an overt act; that the- sending of a letter announcing a consent to the proposal was a. sufficient manifestation, and consummated the contract from the time it was sent."
There is nothing in either the case of Mactier v. Frith,nor in.
that of Vassar v.'C'amp, indicating that this effect is given to
the sending of a letter, because it is sent by mail through the
public post-office ; and, in fact, the letter referred to in the first
case ciuld not have been so sent, for it was to go from the- city
,of New York to Jacmel, in the island of St. Domingo, between
which places there was at that time no communication by mail.
The sending of a letter accepting the proposition is regarded
as an acceptance, because it is an overt act, clearly manifesting
the intention of the party sending it to close with the offier of
him to whom it is sent; and thus making that " aggregatio mentium" which is necessary to constitute a contract.
Mr. Justice MAitcY, in delivering the leading opinion in Mac.
tier v. Frith, says, "1What shall constitute an acceptance will
depend, in great measure, upon circumstances. The mere determination of the mind, unacted on, can never ber an acceptance.
Where the offer is by letter, the usual mode of acceptance is the
sending of a letter announcing a consent to accept; where it is
made by a messenger, a determination to accept, returned through
him, or sent by another, would seem to be all the law requires,
if the contract may be consummated without writing. There are
other actions which are equally conclusive upon the parties ;
keeping silence, under certain circumstances, is an assent to a
proposition; anything that shall amount to a manifestation of a
formed determination to accept, communicated, or put in the proper way to be communicated to the party making the offer, would
doubtless complete the contract."
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It was agreed between these parties that their business should
be transacted through the medium of the telegraph. The object
of this agreement was to substitute the telegraph for other
methods of communication, and to give to their transactions by it
the same force and validity they would derive if they had been
performed through other agencies.
In accordance with this agreement, the offer was made by telegraph to the appellants in New York,; and the acceptance,
addressed to the respondents in New Orleans, was immediately
despatched from New York, by order of the appellants.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellants did not put
their acceptance in a proper way to be communicated to the
respondents, for they adopted the method of communication which
had been used in the transaction by the respondents, and which
had been selected by prior agreement between them, as that by
means of which their business should be transacted.
Under these circumstances the sending of the despatch must
be. regarded as an acceptance of the respondents' offer, and thereupon the contract became complete.
I cannot -conceive upon what principle an agreement to communicate by telegraph can be held to be in effect a warranty by
each party that his communication to the other shall be received.
On the contrary, by agreeing beforehand to adopt that means of
communication, the parties mutually assume its hazards, which
are principally as to the prompt receipt of the despatches.
The referee finds as, a fact that the respondents answered the
telegram of the appellants, asking at what price they would sell
100,000 Mdxican dollars, by another telegram, as follows, viz.:
."Trevor & Colgate, New York: Will deliver fifty thousand
at seven and one-quarter, per Moses Taylor. Answer.
"JOHN WOOD & Co."

It was proved on the trial that this telegram was sent by the
respondents, and a letter of the same date, signed by them,
repeating the telegram, and stating that they had sent it, was
read in evidence.
This affords sufficient evidence of subscription by the respond.
cuts to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds.
The judgment should be reversed.
All the judges concurring except BOCKE and GROVER, JJ., who

concurred only in the result.

Judgment reversed.

HO'E v. EDDY.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

In Chancery.

GEORGE HOWE v. CHARLES B. EDDY AND WALTER TAYLOR.
By the chancery practice of Vermont, where an injunction is awarded, and the
complainant takes out a subpoena returnable to the next term of the court, but
neglects to get it served in time, the injunction is not thereby dissolved, but a new
subpmna may be issued returnable to the next succeeding term.
The respondent may, however, come in at any time, and apply for an order to
have the subptena and bill served on him in order to allow him to answer, or he
may move to dissolve the injunction on account of the complainant's delay, ot
invoke any other action of the-court necessary to protect his rights.

RULE on defendants to show.cause why they should not be dealt
with for contempt of court in disregarding an injunction. Before
Chancellor BARRETT, at the General Term of Supreme Court,
November 1867, PIERPONT, C. J., PECK, WILSON, and STEELE,
JJ., hearing the argument as advisers.
The complainant, in August 1867, was in possession of the law
library of the. late Hon. William C. Bradley, under a claim of
title. 'One Henry A. Willard, as executor of Mr. Bradley's will,
claimed the right, and was. about to use a writ of replevin, to
take possession of the said library. On the 7th of August 1867,
complainant obtained an order, made by Chief Justice PIERPONT
as Chancellor, in pursuance of which, on the 8th day of August,
the Plerk of the Court of Chancery issued a writ of injunction
restraining Willard and all persons acting under him from removing the library from the possession of complainant during the
pendency of said writ, or until the dissolution of said injunction,
or until such further order as the court should make in the
premises.
The defendant Eddy, as attorney of Willard, had taken out a
writ of replevin; and on the 9thr of August went to Brattleboro,
where complainant resided and kept the library, for the purpose
of having the writ served. On presenting it te Mr. Herrick, a
deputy sheriff, he was told that -omplainant had put in his (Herrick's) hands a bill in chancery and injunction, with directions
to serve said injunction on any one whom he should see meddling
with the library; and he then exhibited them to Eddy, who examined them. The bill was the one presented to the Chancellor,
upon which the order for said injunction, issued by the clerk as
aforesaid, was made; and the injunction was the one so issued.
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The bill had been filed by the clerk on said 8th day of August,
pursuant to the order of the Chancellor, and his certificate of such
filing was duly indorsed thereon. A subpoena, dated the same
day, signed by the clerk in common form, was appended to said
bill, returnable to the September Term of the court, which was to
commence on the 10th day of that month. Upon such examination Mr. Eddy concluded not to have said writ of replevin served.
Mr. Willard was a resident of Hudson, New York, or Washington,
D. C., but was spending the summer in Charlestown, N. H., and
was often at Bellows Falls and Westminster, and occasionally at
Brattleboro, in said county of Windham, during said month of
August. Considerable evidence was exhibited in the case, showing various propositions by Mr. Eddy to complainant for some
arrangement for having the bill and injunction served on Mr.
Willard; and considerable conflicting evidence as to.complainant's
expressions o'f a purpose not to have the same served, unless Mr.
Willard, by himself or his agents, should undertake to get possession of the library. The decision of the case, however, did not
d6pend on these facts.
The bill And subpoena were not served seasonably for said term
qf the court, no arrangement having been made in that behalf,
and Willard not having been found within the state by the deputy
sheriff. The last day for the legal service of the subpcena was
the 29th of August. On the next day complainant procured a
new subpcena of the clerk, dated on that day, returnable to ifext
April Term of said court, and substituted it for the one originally
appended to said bill, and replaced the papers in the hands of
said Herrick, with the same instruitions as before. The defendant Eddy being of.opinion that said injunction had become inoperative and void by the failure of service of the same with the bill
and subpoena upon Mr. Willard seasonably for September Term,
and Mr. Willard having been 'advised by counsel to the same
effect, on the 6th day of September, caused a writ of replevin in
his favor against complainant, to be put into the hands of the
other defendant, Taylor, sheriff of said county, with directions to
replevy said library. Eddy accompanied Taylor, at his r.equedt,
to Brattleboro for that purpose. On arriving there it was found
that complainant was absent, and that said library was locked up
in his office, and the key not to be found. Taylor procured
another key and unlocked the door, and he and Eddy Went in

HOWE v. EDDY.

and began to take the books down from the shelves, preparatory
to taking them away by virtue of said writ. While they were
thus in the process of taking down the books, Ierrick the deputy
3heriff saw them, and at once forbade them to remove the books,
telling them that he had said bill and injunction, which he then
showed them, and which they took and made some examination
of and passed back. Eddy signified that he regarded the injunction as of no effect for the reason aforesaid, and that he should have
the writ of replevin served by the taking of said library. Thereupon Taylor and Eddy proceeded to take and remove said library,
and it still remains in the hands of said Taylor. At the SeptemberTerm of said court complainant filed his petition in said court
for an order on said Eddy and Taylor, to show cause why they
should not be dealt with for contempt. Such order was issued,
and evidence was taken showing the facts aforesaid.
H. H. Wheeler, for the orator, cited Gen. Stat. 249, §§ 15,
19; Payjne v. Cowan, 1 Sm. & M. Oh. Rep. 26; Hilliard on
Inj. 111, § 90.,a, 92; 4 W. 0. 0. Rep. 174; Turner v. Scott,
5 Rand. Rep. 332; Harrington v. Am. Ins. Co., 1 Barb. 224;
Hightour v. Rush, 2 Hay's Rep. 361; Baird v. Hoses, 21 Ga.
Rep. 249; West v. Smith, 1 Green Rep. 309; Depeyster v.
Graves, 2 Johns. Ch. Rep. 148; 2 Green Oh.. Rep. 458-9 ; Moat
v. Holbien, 2 Edw. Oh. 88; Partingtdn v. Booth, 8 Meriv.
Rep.. 148 ; Bitb. Ch. Pr. 636 ; 4 Paige's Oh. Rep. 163; 8 Id. 45;
H1illiard on Inj. 142.
0'. B. Eddy and ff. E. Stoughton, -for respondents, cited
Hilliard on Inj. 149, § 32; Elliot v. Osborne, I Cal. Rep. 396;
1 Barb. Oh. Pr. 631, 633, 634 ; Skip v. Howard, 8 Atk. 564;
Hfearne v. Tenant, 14 Yes. 186; Smith's Oh. Pr. 628-4; James
v. Downes, 18 Yes. 522;. 3 Dan. Oh. Pr. 1773, 17T5, 1783;
Gen. Stat. 253, § 55; Hilliard on Inj. 520; Gen. Stat. 249,
§§ 19-20; 4 Paige 439; 5 Id. 85; 2 Mad. 225; Rule: 26 in
Chancery.
Chancellor, after stating the facts.-The views now
to be expressed are concurred in by all the judges who heard the
argument.
- BARRETT,

A primary, and, to a considerable extent, a controlling questionis, whether the failure to have service made on Willard season.-
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ably for the term to which the first subpena wag made returnable,
worked a discontinuance of the proceeding, so that the order of
the Chancellor, and the injunction issued in pursuance of it.
became vacated and void. Our statute, ch. 29, § 55, enacts that
"no injunction shall be issued in any case until the bill shall
have been filed." Sect. 56: "The issuing of a subpoena, attached
to a bill, shall be deemed the filing of the bill." It was not the
purpose of the latter section to exclude any other mode of filing
a bill, but rather to provide a mode by which, for the purpos of
issuing an injunction, it might be regarded as filed, without requiring it actually to be filed. in court according to the law and practice independently of the statute. This is evident from other
provisions of the same chapter. For instavce, in sect. 21, when
the defendant is out of the state, so that the subpoena cannot be
served on him, the complainant may file his bill or petition: in
the office of the. clerk, and the clerk shall issue an order to be
published three weeks successively, the last publication to be at
least twenty days previous to the term at which the defendant is
required to appear. It is beyond question that in such a case,
upon a bill thus filed, a subpoena need not be-attached, and still
the 'bill would be filed, so as fully to c6mply with the statute
requiring it to be filed before an injunction should be issued.
For it will hardly be suggested that an injunction might not as
well be granted against a non-resident defendant (his agents,
servants, and attorneys), upon whom, by reason of his non-residence, a subpoena could not be served, as against a -esident, on
whom a subpoena could be served. This would strongly indic.ate
that the 19th and 20th sections of ch. 29 were not designed to
make, as is claimed, the bill and subpcena one process. In the
present case it would have been legitimate for complainant to file
his bill in the clerk's office, and not have a subpoena appended,
and to take an order for notice to be published, calling on the.
defendant to appear and answer at the next April Term, instead
of the September Term, as, at the time be applied for the injunction, there was not sufficient time to give notice in that way for
the September Term. He, however, did take a subpcena, -aAd
that was, as it must have been, made returnalle to said-September
Term. He, at the same time, had. his bill actually filed, and the
certificate thereof duly indorsed on it by the clerk. If he should
get the subpoena seasonably served, he would not need to resort
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to any otner mode of service ; but if he should not, it would seem
to be a strange effect to give to the fact of his taking a subpena
and failing to get it served, to hold that thereby he lost any right
.hat he would have had if he had not taken such subpoena. Sections 19 and 20 do not purport t0 make the bill and subpcena one
process. Sect. 19 provides that process issued out of the Court
of Chancery shall be signed by the clerk or a chancellor, withoutdefining what shall constitute process. It may be original, as a
subpoena. It may be final, as an execution. It may be a writ
of sequestration, or it may be an injunction. Sect. 20 only
provides that the original subpoena, with the bill, shall be served
in .the same manner as- writs of summons. That obviously is
designed to apply to cases in which service is to be made for the
purpose of bringingthe party into court to answer the bill, and
await upon the proceeding in due course of ordinary litigation in
that court, and only to cases in which the subpcena and service of
it constitute the only mode .of effecting that.purpose. It does not
undertake to connect the two as necessary to constitute the process meant in-the preceding section, but only to prescribe the
mode in which the subpena shall be served for the purpose
intended, viz.: it shall be served with the bill. In the English
chAncery law the subpoena is entirely distinct from the bill for all
purposes. The bill is filed in the court before any subpoena is
issued. It is issued in pursuance of the prayer of the bill thus
filed, and its *office is to compel the defendant to appear and.
answer the same: (see Smith's Oh. Pr. 110). There is an exception to the necessity of having the bill filed before subpcena is
issued, when the bill prays that an injunction may be awarded
against the defendant; in which case it is sufficient if the bill be
filed on or before the day on which the sfibpcena is made returnable : (see Id.). The subpoena alone is served, the bill remaining on file ; and successive subpoenas may be obtained to meet
the various exigencies that may require this to be done.in tfie
progress of the cause.
Various considerations of supposed
inconvenience and injury likely to result to the defendant have
been suggested, as reasons why the court should hold as claimed
by the respondents. But they do not seem to be well grounded.
When a bill has been presented to a chancellor for some prelimi
nary or interlocutory order warranted by the law, the cause is
then to be regarded as pending in court for all purposes arising
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from or incident to such order; and for all such matters the
court is at all times open and accessible to all the parties affected
thereby. If an order has been obtained ex parte, which affects
the other party, and he has knowledge of it, he may at once, and
at dny stage, come before the court with any proper application
in the premises, and invoke any action by the court that may be
proper to secure his rights and serve his convenience. If, for
instance, an injunction has been obtained which operates upon his
interests, without having been served on. him with the subpcena
and bill, and which be desires to have dissolved, and in order
thereto it is necessary for him to answer the bill, on application
to the Chancellor he could obtain an order that the subpcena withthe bill should be served, or a copy of the bill furnished to him by
a time named. In the present case, Mr. Willard, having been fully
apprised of the existence of the bill and injunction, which had not
been served on him seasonably for the September Term, might
have appeared in'court at that term, and moved to have the cause
entered on the docket, and it would have been so ordered and
then it would have stood, for all proper proceedings, the same as
if thd bill and injunction had been formally served. If there
had been imlroper delay in the'service of the bill or of the injunctibn, he might have appeared before the Chancellor and moved for
the dissolution or discharge of the injunction. The cause was in
fact pending in the court from the time the Chancellor made the
order for issuing said injunction. But, though the defendalit
was not bound to appear and answer to it, still he was, at liberty
to do so, and it would iot have been permissible for the orator to
object.
Without taking further time to discuss or illustrate this aspect.
of the case, in the opinion of the court, the failure to serve the
original subpcena with the bill and injunction did not work a dis.
continuance affecting the validity and force of the order of the
Chancellor,. or of the injunction issued in pursuance of it, and the
same,-notwithstanding such failure, were in force at the time said
injunction was exhibited to the respondents 'by the deputy, sheriff
on the occasion of taking away said library.
The evidence is satisfactory that the complainant did not intend
to discontinue his bill, or the order and process of injunction, and
we think that the course he pursued did not work such a result.
This brings us to the inquiry, whether, even if it were shown
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that he improperly delayed to have said papers served, to such
an extent as to constitute adequate ground for a dissolution of
the injunction, on motion for that cause, it was lawful, or justifiable, for the respondents to disregard, and act in violation of it.
On this point there seems to be entire uniformity in the text-books
ai.d cases: 3 Dan- Ch. Pr. 1782. "Although an injunction be
irregularly obtained, it is still an order of the court, and must be
discharged before it can be disobeyed." Edw. on Inj. 102;
Barbr. Ch. Pr. 636; Edwards' Ch. Rep. 188, and note. No case
or book has been cited showing that, in- any case, does mere
impropriety in using an injunction work a dissolution or discharge of it, and leave a party, who is so charged with knowledge
of it as to be amenable for contempt if he violates it, at liberty to
violate or disregard it. The most that has been held is, that such
impropriety may be good cause for a dissolution or discharge on
motion: 3 Dan. Ch. Pr. 1783 (note 3), and cases cited 2 J. C.
Rep. 204; 5 Paige 85 ; 1 Hopkins 342. Ih the case of James v.
.Downeg, 18 Yes. 522, the plaintiff, after obtaining an order,
neglected for four months to have it drawn up or served. Lord
ELDoN would not proceed for contempt against the other party,
who, after that lapse of time, acted in disregard of it, his only
knowledge of it being that he was present at the hearing of the
motion. In Drewry on Inj. 399, in remarking on that case, it is
said," The diitinction seems that the defendant shall not escape
the process, if he heard the motion, merely by turning his back
upon the court so -as not actually to hear it pronounced; but that,
on the other hand, the order is not to be kept suspended over his
head for an indefinite length of time." That case does not apply
to this, for the reason that the defendant, Willard, had full knowledge of the bill and injunction, and Eddy, his attorney, had seen
it on the 9th of August, and he and Taylor both knew of and saw
it on the 6th day of September, before they took the books, when
it was presented to them as being in force to restrain theni from
so doing ; and for the still other reason, that, in view of all that
appears in the case, Willard did not put himself in position to
entitle him to claim that complainant had unreasonably delayed
making service of the bill. His knowledge of the bill and
injunction charged him with the duty of regarding said injunction,
and it was so known to, and served upon the respondents as to
charge them with the same duty: Lawes v. Morgan, 5 Price
VOL. XVI.-15
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Rep. 518. The defendant in the bill being non-resident in the
state, it appertained to hi'm, under the circumstances, to show
that he had exposed himself to service to the knowledge of the
orator or the offiuer holdihg the papers, so that service might have
been made on him with reasonable convenience, without bargaining or watching for an opportunity. Indeed, no question is made.
but ihat the defendant, as well as the respondents, had sufficient
notice and knowledge of the injunction to render it operative upon
them, provided it was in force at the time the respondents took the
library. The cases cited in their behalf bear in their favor only
ag touching the order that the court should make as to punish
ment, by fine or otherwise, for the violation of said injunction:
see Partngton v. Boo'th, 8 Meriv. 148 ; 4 IPaige 444. In this
case it is not claimed, or shown, that the respondents acted with
intent of violating or disregarding an injunction that was in force.
They acted upon the honest, though erroneous opinion, that the
injunction had expired. In so doing they violated the legal rights
of the complainant. Full satisfaction to the complainant and ,
the court will be made by the restoration of the library to th"
possession of. the complainant, in the place and condition front
which it was taken by the respondents. A proper order will b6
made.to effect such restoration.

United States Circuit Court for Wiscon*sin. NYov. Term 1867
JOHN -GREENING, OWNER OF SCHOONER PERSEVERANCE, v.
SCHOONER GREY EAGLE.1
The fact that one vessel carries a prohibited light does not absolve another
from the observance of the 'caution and nautical skill required by the exigencies

of the case.
Although a white light usually represents a vessel at anchor, an omissiou to
watch the light and ascertain from its bearings whether the vessel is in motion, is
a neglect of ordinary care and skill, and makes the 6ollision the. result of mutual
fault.
There may be circumstances under which a vessel that is unable to show thf
proper lights may nevertheless continue her voyage at night. Per DAvis, J. -

Tnis was a libel for collision, first tried at Milwaukee in the

I We

are indebted for this case to the courtesy of.J. D. Cleveland, Esq.-ED.
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District Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin,
in which court the action was dismissed. Libellant appealed to
the Circuit Court, where the case was again argued on the same
pleaaings and evidence.
The schooner Perseverance sailed from Chicago on the 19th of
November 1864, with a cargo of wheat, bound for Ogdensburgh.
When in Lake Michigan, off the Manitow Islands during a severe
storm she lost her signal lights which she was unable to replace
after making efforts to do so. Owing to the lateness of the season, the severity of the weather, and the extent of her voyage,
being unwilling to incur.the delay of lying by at night, she proceeded on her way- showing at night a white light in order to call
the attention of other vessels to her. While running through the
Straits of Mackinaw, at two o'clock in the morning of the 24th of
November, the schooner Grey Eagle bound from Buffalo to MiIwaukee, collided with her and destroyed both vessel and cargo.
Willey J4 Cary, of Cleveland, for libellant.
Emmhons J. 'Vandyke, of Milwaukee, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DAvis, J.-It is argued that as the Perseverance was running
without the regular lights and with the prohibited white light,.she
must bear all the damages, although the court should find that the
Grey Eagle was also in. fault. This position is untenable. -It is
unquestionably true that the rules of navigation as prescribed by
the Act of Congress must be observed, but in obeying and construing these rules, due regard must be had to all dangers of navi.
gation. The fact that the Perseverance had a light prohibited to
vessels while sailing, did not of itself absolve the Grey Eagle
from the observance of that degree of caution, care, and nautical
skill which the exigencies of the case required. If a white light
usually represented a vessel at anchor, the officers and s6amen
of the Grey Eagle had no right to conclifde that it always did.
It was their duty from the moment the light was seen, to have
watched it carefully, in order to ascertain from its bearings whether the vessel was in motion or at anchor. And if, in the exercise of ordinary nautical skill and care, this could have been done,
and was omitted, and this omission contributed to the accident,
then the Grey Eagle must share the burdens of the loss although
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the Perseverance was in fault in running with a prohibited light.
I cannot say that a vessel is under all circumstances required to
come to an anchor at night, if through misfortune she has lost her
signal lights. There may be a state of case in which herself and
cargo would be in more peril by delay at night than by pursuing
a continuous voyage. It is true that she encounters serious
hazard by running at night, but she is so far protected that every
other vessel occupying the same waters must be navigated with
reasonable care, skill, and caution.
The obligation of the Grey Eagle to use all reasonable precau.
tions to avoid a collision was not varied because the Perseverance
was running with a prohibited light. The present case is one of
mutual fault, which in my opinion requires a division of damages.
It is unnecessary to discuss the evidence at length in order to
show carelessness and fault on the part of the Grey. Eagle. She
is convicted of ordinary want of seamanship in her own statement
of the collision.
The ans*er says, "A white light was seen about a mile distant,
which was supposed to be a light on shore or upon a vessel at
anchor. The Grey Eagle was then kept away about a point and
steadied in her course, to give berth to the light. The light was
not discovered to be a vessel's light iii motion by the commanding
officer until the Perseverance got within about three lengths of
the vessel."
And why was this important discovery, not sooner made ? The
night was not too dark.to do it, for the evidence is thbat the sails
of the Perseverance could*readily have been seen a qtiarter of-' a
mile off, and the wheelsman of the Grey Eagle (in not the best
portion of the vessel to see the light) nevertheless saw it twenty
minutes before the collision.
If the light was discovered a mile off, is it not apparent that
ordinary vigilance would have disclosed to those on board the
Grey Eagle that it was on a vessel in motion long before there
was any danger of collision? The vessels could not have kept
cheir respective courses without it being evident to a watchful
seaman that the light was in motion. I cannot for want of time
analyze the evidence so as to show-how the collision could have
been avoided if the light of the Perseverance had been properly
watched. It is very clear -the. persons in charge of the Grey
Eagle were .so confident the light, was stationary that they rested
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in security and omitted the observations which good and prudent
seamanship required to be made, and which, if made, could not
have failed to have disclosed to them the character of the light,
-nd enabled them to keep out of the way of the Perseverance.
This conduct on the part of the Grey Eagle contributed very
materially to the collision, and that vessel should share with the
Perseverance the consequences of that disaster.
The Clerk of the Circuit Court is therefore directed to enter
an order, reversing the decree of the District Uourt, and referring
the case to a commissioner, to ascertain the damages.

Superior ourt of Ohicago.
WILLIAM O'MEARA v. PATRICK DEAN ET UX.
PATRICK DEAN AND WIFE v. O'MEARA.
A deed of her separate estate executed by a married woman without her husband

joining, is void.
THEsE were cross-bills for partition. One Patrick Rider died
in 1856, seised of certain real estate, which he devised equally
to his wife, Mary Rider, now Mary Dean, and his dauighters,
Margaret, Mary Ann, and Catharine. Catharine intermarried in
1862'with one Almeron Smith, and died in 1865, in Memphis,
Tenn. In 1864, for a valuable consideration, part of which was
paid down, Gatharine Smith executed to her mother, residing in
Chicago, a deed of her undivided interest in the lot. The deed
was formally delivered by Mrs. Smith to the grantee therein, but
was afterwards redelivered to her for the purpose of procuring
its execution by her husband in Memphis. The husband refused
to execute it, and it was never returned to the grantee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
JAMISON, J.-The question raised is, whether the transfer from
Mrs. Smith to her mother was effectual to convey her title, the
grantor being at the date of the deed afeme covert. This makes
it necessary to construe the Statute of 1861, entitled "1An Act. to
protect married women in their separate property." The terms
of the act are, 1 that all the property, both real and personal,
belonging to any married woman as her sole and separate pro-
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perty, or which any woman hereafter married owns at the time
of her marriage, or which any married woman, during coverture,
acquires, in good faith, from any person, other than her husband,
by descent, devise, or otherwise, together with all rents, issues,
increase, and profits thereof shall, notwithstanding her maniage,
be and remain, during coverture, her sole and separate property,
under her sole control, and be held, owned, possessed, and enjoyed
by her, the same as though she was sole and unmarried, and shall
not be subject to the disposal, control, or interference of her hus-_
band, and shall be exempt from execution or attachment for the
debts of her husband."
This is a remedial statute, and must be so construed -as to
advance the remedy intended by its framers. It is contended by
the counsel for Mrs. Dean, the grantee, that the phraseology of
the statute is- so broad as to give to a married woman the jus
disponendi, that is, the right to sell, encumber,.or devise her property, independently of her husband. The property of the wife,
it is said, is to be and remain her sole and separate property,
under her sole control, ahd be held, owned, possessed, and enjoyed.
by her, the same as though she were sole and unmarried. How,
it is asked, can a married woman hold, own, possess, and enjoy
her property the game

.as

though she were sole and unmarried,

unless she have the right of selling it ? It must be admitted, the
language of the act is very strong but I cannot think it decisive.
It is unsafe to construe a statute by refei'ence alone to its terms.
The court must ask, what was the mischief against which this act
was aimed? In the case of the" property of married women,
before the statute, the mischief was that the personal chattels of.
the wife, upon .her marriage, became absolutely the property of
her husband. Her choses in action became his absolutely when
reduced to his possession; and "th e rents, issues, increase, and
profits" of the real estate came at once into his hands upon the
marriage, subject to his Absolute disposition. Thus, -everything
that was his wife's became, for the purpose of present enjoyment,
the husband's, and so far. as its nature permitted, was liable. to
execution or attachment for his debts. The evil, therefore, was,
not that the wife could not sell without her husbAnd's consentfor the husband was generally eager to sell that he might enjoy
the proceeds-but that the husband had the power to squander
the wife's property, or its rents and profits, without her consent.
.
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At last our legislature came to see the injustice of such a condition, and they passed, in 1861, an act to remedy it. That act
shows in its title the scope intended by it. It was "an act to
protect married women in their separate property," not to enable
them to divest themselves of it without the concurrence of their
husbands. Other considerations point to the same conclusion.
Th3 strong words of the act, authorizing a married woman to hold
and enjoy her property "1as though she were sole and unmarried,"
must be construed with reference to the, marriage relation between
the parties. Suppose the wife owns the homestead, including
buildings and furniture. Has the husband no rights with respect
to it? May she sell it away from him in spite of his protest, or,
if she choose to retain it, bring trespass if he enter her house,
seat himself at her .table, or approach her bed ? This would
make of the st~tute an act for the divorcement, a mensa -et thoro,
at their own discretion, of-all married women having property
of the species indicated. The meaning of the statute, then, must
be that the wife is to enjoy her separate property as though sole
and unmarried, so far as a married woman can, that is, enjoy it
together with her husband, -and not to the exclusion of him:
Naylor v. Field, 5 Dutch. 287 ; Walker v. Beamy, 36 Penn. St.
414. She is to be protected in the use of it, with her husband
and children,..against the husband himself and his ereditbrs.
The"act, moreover, seems to protect the husband in such rights as •
he may have after the death of the wife.' She ia to hold, possess,
an& enjoy her property "1during coverture" only. If the wife
die, what right has the husband to his wife's property ? He has
the right, under the conditions prescribed by law, to a tenancy,
by the curtesy, in his wife's lands-a right often of great value.
The conditions of its arising are: 1. Marriage ; 2. Actual seisin
of the wife during coverture ; 3. Issue born alive; and, 4. Death
of the wife: 4 Kent Com. 29. By the common law in force in
this state, this estate vests in the husband immediately upon the
birth of a child, and is called a tenancy by the curtesy initiate.
On the death of the wife the right becomes eonsummate. We
cannot presume that the legislature intended to take 8way so
important a right, unless it has used words necessarily importing
suel an intention. Not only is no such intention derivable from
the statute, but the contrary is clearly expressed. It limits the
time during which the wife may hold and enjoy her property, in
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the manner indicated, to the coverture, thus leaving such inchoate
rights as the husband may have to his wife's estate to ripen and
fall to him after the coverture is ended. The words of the statute are, shall hold, possess, enjoy, &c., "1during coverture."
The husband having thus an interest in his wife's lands from the
moment of the birth of a living child, the wife cannot, without
his joining in the deed, convey them so as to defeat the right:
and, as there must be but one rule for construing the statute, if
the wife cannot convey where there is an initiateright of cur
t.esy, she cannot, under this statute, where there is none. In
other words, the law of Illinois provides a mode in which the
'wife joining with her husband may alienate her lands. It is not
to be presumed the legislature intended to repeal this provision
by the Act of 1861, unless the intention is very clearly expressed.
Not only is no such intention expressed, but it is highly probable,
from the terms of the act itself, that the object of it was merely
to protect the wife in the enjoyment of her property, as far as
the nature'of her relation as a married woman would permit, and
leave to the husband after her death such rights as he might have
acquired. Since the argument of this case, and, indeed, since
this opinion was written, a decision of our Supreme Court has
been published, Bose et al. v. Sanderson, 38 111.- R. 247, which
strengthens me in the conclusion I have reached. In that case,
real estate had descended to a,married woman,.from her father,
before the Act of 1861 was passed. At the time the-act went
into effect she was the m~ther of several children, born alive
under circumstances such as to give her husband a tenancy in her
lands by the curtesy. The husband's interest in these lan.ds
being attached and sold for his debts, a bill was filed to set aside
the levy, on the ground that the entire interest in the lands was
exempted from levy and sale under the Act of 1861. It was
held by the court that the husband's interest as tenant by the
curtesy was liable to attachient for his lebts, and the bill was
dismigsed.
Obviously, if the husband had an interest in the lands belong
ing to his wife at the date of the act, whicll his creditors could
take and hold as against the wife, she could not,. by a- sale made
without the concurrence of her husband, divest him of such interest. The legislature could not empower her to do so.
To the same general effect, also, are those decisions in other
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states on statutes similar to ours, that a power to a married
woman to take and enjoy property to her separate use does
not involve the jus disponendi, the right to sell, pledge, or encumber it: MIiller v. Wetherby, 12 Iowa 415 ; Naylor v. P;eld,
5 Dutcher 287; Walker v. Beamy, 36 Penna. St. 410.
The case of Billings v. Baker, 28 Barb. 343, is no authority
against the position assumed here, because the New York statute,
under which it arose, authorized the wife not only to take and
hold to- her separate use, but to " convey and devise," real and
personal property.
There having been, tlherefore, no transfer to Mrs. Dean by the
conveyance in question, a decree.will be entered accordingly.

Circuit Court of the United States.

District of Kentucky.

THE UNITED STATES v. JOHN RHODES ET AL.1
Undei the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, abolishing
slavery and giving to "Congress power to enforce this Article by appropriate
legislation," Congress is authorized to pass the Act of April 6th 1866, known as
the CIVIL EIGHTS L w, and said law is constitutional.
Under this act all persons stand upon a plane of ekuality before the law, as
respects the civil rights therein mentioned and intended to be protected, without
distinction as to ice or color or any previous-condition of slavery.
If a state law denies any of these rights, e. g., the right of colored persons to'
testify, this act gives to the courts of the United .States jurisdiction of all causes,
civil and criminal, which affect or concern such persons.
Where a white person commits the crime of burglary, by breaking and entering
the house of a colored person, in a state whose laws deny to such colored person
the right to testify against the accused, the latter may b& indicted, prosecuted, and
convicted for such offence in the Courts of the United States.

THis was an indictment for burglary, prosecuted in this court
under the Act of Congress of the 6th of April 1866, entitled
"An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil
rights, and to furnish the means for their vindication." The indictment charged that the defendants, being white persons, did on the
night f May 1st 1866, in the county of Nelson, burglariously
break and enter the house of Nancy Talbot, a citizen of the United
I We give a large amount of space to the following case, on account of the
general interest it has excited, as shown by letters of inquiry particularly from
our subscribers in the Southern States.-ED. Axc. LAW REG.
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States, of African descent, who was then and is now denied the
right to testify against the defendants in the courts of Kentucky
The defendants having been found guilty by a jury, a motion
was made in arrest of judgment.
Three grounds were relied upon in support of the motion:1. That the indictment was fatally defective.
2. That the case which it makes, or was intended to make, is
not within the Act of Congress upon which it is founded.'
3. That ihe act itself is unconstitutional and void.
1. The objection to the indictment was, that it averred that the
right to testify was denied to the prosecutor by the law of Kentucky, but did not aver that white persons possessed such right.
The court, however, was of opinion that the count -was good,
because the right of white persons to testify under similar circumstances was given by a public statute of Kentucky, of which
the court was bound to take notice, and being a conclusion of law
from the facts stated, needed not to be averred in the indictment ;
citing 1 Chit. Crim. Law 188; 2 Bos. & Pull. 127; 2 Leach 942;
1 Bishop's Qrim. Procea. §§ 52, 53.
2. The 1st section of the act provides that all citizens of the
United States shall have the same rights in every state . .. to sue,
be parties, and give evidence. The 3d section gives jurisdiction
to this court "of all causes, criminal and civil, affecting persons
who are denied, or cannot enforce in the courts of the'state where
they may be, any of the rights secured to them by the 1st section." It was argued that in a criminal prosecution the only
persons affected are the government and the accused, and therefore this was not a case affecting, Nancy Talbot within the act:
U. S. v. Ortega, 11, Wheat. 467. The court was of opinion,
however, that the phrase "causes civil and criminal" must be
understood to mean causes of civil action and causes of criminal
yrosecution, which do affect the plaintiff in the one case, and the
party against whose person or property the offence is committed
in the other: Osborn.v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 584. The
construction contended for would limit the operation of the :act to
the prosecution of colored persons, a purpose already provided
for by the laws of all the states. The plain intentof the act was
I On account of the great length of the case we are obliged to abridge the repor;
.X the first and second points.-ED. Am. L.w REG.
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to protect such persons in cases where the laws of the states in
which they lived failed to do so.
3. As to the constitutionality of the act.
SWAYNE, J.-The first eleven amendments of the constitution

were intended to limit the powers of the government which it
created, and to protect the people of the states......
The twelfth amendment grew out of the contest between Jeffer
son and Burr for the presidency.
The thirteenth amendment is the last one made. It trenches
directly upon the powef of the states and of the people of the
states. It is the first and only instance of a change of this character in the organic law. It destroyed the most important relation
between capital and labor in all the states where slavery existed.
It affected deeply the fortunes of a large portion of their people.
It struck out of existence millions of property. The measure was
the consequence of a strife of opinions, and a conflict of interests,
real or imaginary, as old as the constitution itself. These elements 6f discord grew in intensity. Their violence was increased
by the throes and convulsions of a 'civil war. The impetuous
vortex finally swallowed up the evil, and with it for ever the
power to replace it. Those who insisted upon the adoption of
this amendment were animated by no spirit of vengeance. They
sought securify against the recurrence of a sectional conflict.
They felt that much was due to the African race for the part it
had borne during the war. They were also impelled by a sense
of right, and by strong sense of justice, lo an unoffending and
long-suffering people. These considerations must not be lost
sight of when we come to examine the anendment in order to
ascertain its proper construction.
The Act of Congress confers citizenship. Who are citizens,
and what are their rights? The constitution uses the words
"citizen" and "natural born citizens ;" but neither that instrument nor any Act of Congress has attempted to define their
meaning. British jurisprudence, whence so much of our own is
drawn, throws little light upon the subject. In Johnson's Dictionary " Citizen" is thus defined: "1. A freeman of a city ; not
a foreigner; not a slave; 2. A townsman, a man of trade; not a
gentleman; 3. An inhabitant; a dweller in any place." The
definitions given by other English lexicographers are substan-
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tially the same.

In Jacob's Law Dictionary (edition of 1783),

the only definition given is as follows: "Citizens (cives) of London are either freemen or such as reside and keep a family in thu
city, &c. ; and some are citizens and freemen, and some are not.
who have not so great privileges as others. The citizens of
London may prescribe against a statute because their liberties
are re-enforced by statute :" 1 Roll. 105.
Blackstone and Tomlin contain nothing upon the subject.
"The word civis, taken in the strictest sense, extends only to him
that is entitled to the privileges of a city, of which he is a member, and in that sense there is a distinction between a citizen and
an inhabitant within the same city, for every inhabitant there is
not a citizen :" Scott qui tam v. Swartz, Com. Rep. 68.
"A citizen is a freeman who has kept a family in a city :"
Boy v. Hanger, 1 Roll. Rep. 188, 149.
"The term citizen, as understood in our law, is precisely analo.
gous to the term subject in the common law ; and the change of
phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The
sovereignty has been cbangdd from one man to the collective
body of the people, and he"who before was a subject of the king
is.now a citizen of the state :" The State v. Manuel, 4 'Dev. &
Batt. 26.
In Shanks et al. v. Dupont et al., 3 Peters 247, the Supreme
Court of the United States said: "During the Wvar each party
claimed the allegiance of the natives of the colonies as due exclusively to itself. The Americans insisted upon the allegiance of
all born within the states respectively ; and Great Britain asserted
an equally exclusive claim. The treaty of 1783 acted .upon the
state of things as itexisted it that period. It took the actual
state of things as its basis. All those, whether natives or otherwise, who then adhered to the. American states, 'were virtually
absolved from their allegiance to the British Crown, and those
who then adhered to the British Crown, were deemed and held
subjects of that Crown. The treaty of peace was a treaty operating between tue states on each side, and the inhabitants thereof;,
in the language of the seventh article, it was a 'firm and'perpetual peace between his Britannic Majesty and the said ttates,
and between the subjects of the one and the citizens of the other.'
Who then were subjects or citizens was to bt decided by the state
of facts. If.they were originally subjects of Great Britain, %nd
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then adhered to her and were claimed by her as subjects, the
treaty deemed them such; if they were originally British subjects,
but then adhering to the states, the treaty deemed them citizens."
All persons born in the allegiance of the king are natural born
subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United
States are natural born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together..
Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of
this country as well as of England. There are two exceptions,
and only two, to the universality of its application. The children
of ambassadors are in theory born in the allegiance of the powers
the ambassadors represent, and slaves, in legal contemplation, are
property, and not persons: 2 Kent's Com. (last ed.) 1; Calvin's
Case, 7 Coke 1 ; 1 B1. Com. 366 ; Lynch v. Clark, 1 Sandf. Ch.
Rep. 139.
The common law has made no distinction on-account of race or.
color. None is now made in England nor in any other Christian
country of Europe.
The fourth of the Articles of Confederation declared that 11the
free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds,
and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of free citizens in the United States,"
&c. On the 25th of June 1778, when these Articles were under
-onsideration by the Congress, South Carolina moved to amend
thiv fourth article by inserting after the word "free" and before
the word "inhabitants,," the word "white."
Two states voted.
for the amendment and eight against it. The vote of one was
divided: Scott v. Sandford, 19 Hbw. 575. When the Constitution
was adopted free men of color were clothed with the franchise of
voting in at least five states, and were a part of the people whose
sanction breathed into it the breath of life: Scott v. Sandford,
19 How. 573; The State v. Manuel, 2 Dev. & Batt. 24, 28.
"Uitizens under our constitution and laws mean free inhabitants born within the United States or naturalized under the laws
of Congress :" 1 Kent's Coin. 292, note.
We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of
the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It.
has always obtained here with the same vigor and subject only to
the sp.me exceptions, since as before the Revolution.
It i; further said in the note in 1 Kent's Commentaries, before
referred to : " If a slave born in the United States be manumitted
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or otherwise lawfully discharged from bondage, or if a black man
born in the United States becomes free, he becomes thenceforward
a citizen, but under such disabilities as the laws of the several
states may deem it expedient to prescribe to persons of color."
In the case of The State v. Manuel it was remarked: "It has
been said that by the Constitution of the United States, the power
of naturalization has been conferred exclusively upon Congress,
and therefore it cannot be competent for any state by its municipal
regulations to make a citizen. But what is naturalization? It
is the removal of the disabilities of alienage. Emancipation is
the removal of the incapacity of slavery. The latter depends
wholly upon the internal regulations of the state. The former
belongs to the government of the United States. It would be
langerous to confoiind them :" p. 25. This was a decision of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, made in the year 1836. The
opinion was delivered by Judge GASTON. He was one of the most
able and learned judges this country has produrced. The same
court, in1848, Chief Justice RUFFIN delivering the opinion, referred
to -the case of The State v. Zkanuel, and said: "That case underwent a very.laborious investigation by both the bench and the
bar. The case was brought here by appeal, and was felt to be
one of very great importance in principle. It, was considered
with an anxiety and care worthy of the principle involved, and
which give it a controlling influence upon all questions of a similar
nature :" -The State v. Newcomb, 5 Iredell R. 253.
We cannot deny the assent of our judgment to thd soundness
of the proposition that the emancipation of a native born slave by
removing the disability of slavery made him a citizen. If these
views be correct, the provision in the Act of Congress conferring
citizenship was unnecessary and is inoperative. Granting this to
be so, it was well, if Congress had the power, to insert it, in order
to prevent doubts and differences of opinion which might otherwise have existed upon the subject. We are aware that a majority of the court in the case of Scott v. Sandford, arrived at coclusions different from those we have expressed. But in our judgment these points were not before them. They decided that the
whole case, including the agreed facts, was open to their.examination, and that Scott was a slave. This central and controlling
fact excluded all other questions, and what was said upon them
by those of the majority, with whatever learning and ability the
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argument was conducted, is no more binding upon this court as
authority than the views of the minority upon the same subjects:
Carroll v. Carroll,16 How. 287.
The fact that one is a subject or citizen determines nothing as
to his rights as such. They vary in different localities and according to circumstances.
Citizenship has no necessary connection with the franchise of
voting, eligibility to office, or indeed with any other rights, civil
or political. Women, minors, and persons non comyos are citizens,
and not the less so on account of their disabilities. In England,
not to advert to the various local regulations, the new reform bill
gives the right of voting for members of Parliament to about
800,000 persons from whom it. was before withheld. There,
the subject is wholly within the control of Parliament. Here,
until the 13th amendment was adopted, the power belonged entirely
to the states, and they exercised it without question from any
quarter, as absolutely as if .they were not members of the Union.
The first ten amendments to the constitution, which are in the
nature of a bill-of rights, apply only to the national government.
They w'ere not intended to restrict the power of the states : Barrows v. The Mayor, &c., 7 Peters 247; Withers v. Buckley et
al., 20 How. 84; Murphy v. The People, 2 Cowen 818.
Our attention has been called to several treaties by which
Indians were made citizens; to those by which Louisiana,
Florida, and (alifornia were acquired, and to the act passed in
relation to Texas. All" this was done under the war and treatymaking powers of the constitution, and those which authorize the
national government to regulate the territory and other property
of the United States, and . to admit new states into the Union:
American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Peters 511; Cross v. Harrison,
16 How. 164; 2 Story on the Const. 158.
These powers are not involved in the question before us, and it.
is not necessary particularly to consider them. A few remarks,
however, in this connection will not be out of place. A treaty is
declared by the, constitution to be the "law of the land." What
is unwarranted or forbidden by the constitution can no more be
done in one way than in another. The authority of the national
government is limited, though supreme in the sphere of its opera.
tion. As compared with the state governments, the.subjects upon
,which it operates are few in number. Its objects are all national.
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It is one wholly of delegated powers. The states possess all
which they have not surrendered ; the government of the Union
only such as the constitution has given to it, expressly or incidentally, and by reasonable intendment. Whenever an act of
that government is challenged a grant of power must be shown.
or the act is void.
"The power to make colored persons citizens has been actually
exercised in repeated and important instances. See the treaty with
the Choctaws of September 27th 1830, art. 14 ; with the Cherokees of May 20th 1836, art. 12; and the treaty of Guadaloupe
Hidalgo of the 2d of February 1848, art. 8 :" Scott v. Sandford,

19 Howard 486-Judge CuRTs' opinion.
See, also, the treaty with France of April 30th 1803, by which
Louisiana was acquired, art. 3; and the treaty with Spain of the
23d of February 1819, by which Florida was acquired, Art. 3.
The article referred to in the treaty with France, and in the
treaty .with Spain, is in the same language. In both, the phrase
"inhabitants" is used. No discrimination is made against those,
in- whole or in part, of the African race. So in the treaty of
Guadaloupe.Hidalgo'(articles 8 and 9), no reference is made to color.
Our attention has been called to three provisions of the constitution, besides the 13th amendment, each of which will be briefly
adverted to.
1. Congress has power "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization :" Art. 1, § 8. After considerable fluctuations of juditial
opinion it was finally settled by the Supreme Court that this power
is vested exclusively iii Congress: Oollet v. 0ollet, 2.Dall. 294
United States v. Velati, 2 Dall. 370; Golden v. Prince,' 3
Wash. C. C. R. 13; Chirac v. Chirav, 2 Wheat. 259; Bouston
v. Moore; 2 Wheat. 49; Federalist, No. 32.
An alien naturalized is "to all intents and purposes a natural
born subject:" Co. Litt. 129.'
"Naturalization takes effecl from birth; denization from the
date of the patent:" Vin. Ab., tit. Alien D.
Until the passage of a late Act of Parliament, naturalization
in England was effected by a special statute in each case. The
statutes were usually alike. The form appears in Goq~frey v.
Dickson, Cro. Jac. 539, c. 7. Under the late act, a resident
alien may accomplish the object by a petition to the secretary of
itate for the home department.
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The power is applicable only to those of foreign birth. Alienage is an indispensable element in the process. To make one of
domestic birth a citizen, is not naturalization, and cannot be
brought within the exercise of that power. There is an universal
agreement of opinion upon this subject: Scott v. Sandford, 19
How. p. 578; 2 Story on the Constitution 44.
In the exercise of this power Congress has confined the law to
white persons. No one doubts their authority to extend it to all
aliens, without regard to race or color. But they were not bound
to do so. As in other cases, it was for them to determine the
extent and the manner in"which the power given should be exercised. They could not exceed it, but they were not bound to
exhaust it. It was well remarked by one of the dissenting judges
in Scott v. San4ford, 19 Howard 586, in regard to the African
race : "The constitufion has not excluded them, and since that
has conferred on Congress the power to naturalize colored aliens,
it certainly shows color is not a necessary qualification for citizenship under the Constitution of the United States." It may be
added that before the adoption of the constitution, the states possessed the power of making both those of foreign and domestic
birth citizens, according to their discretion. This power as to
the former they surrendered. They did not as to the latter, and
they still possess it.
"']The poweri not delegated to the United States by this constitution, nor prohibited by- it to the states, are reserveci to the
states respectively, or to the people :" Cons., 10th amendment.
What the several states under the original constitution only
could have done, the nation has done by the 13th amendment"
An occasion for the exercise of this power by the states may not,
perhaps cannot, hereafter arise.
2. "The citizens of each state shall be entitled- to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states :" Cons., art.
4,§ 2.
This provision of the constitution applies only to citizens going
from one state to another.
"It- is obvious that if the citizens of each state were to be
deemed aliens to each other, they could not take or hbld real
estate, or other privileges, except as other aliens."
"The intention of this clause was to confer on them, if one may
so say, a general citizenship, and to communicate all the priviVOL. XVI.-16
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leges and immunities which the citizens of the same state would be
entitled to under the same circumstances:" 2 Story on Cons., § 187.
Chancellor KENT says: " If citizens remove from one state to
another they are entitled to the privileges that persons of the same
description are entitled to in the state to which the removal is
made, and to none other :" 2 Com. 36.
This provision does not bear particularly upon the question
before us, and need not be further consider'ed.
3. "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this
Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each
of them against invasion, d.nd on application of tlie legislature or
of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic violence :" Art. 4, § 4.
Mr. Justice STORY, adopting the language of the Federalist,
says, that but for this power, "a successful faction raiight prect a
tyranny, on the rflins of order and law, while no succor could be
constitutionally afforded by the Union to the friends and supporters of the Government."
* * * "But a right implies a
remedy, and where- else could the remedy be deposited than
where it is iaeposited by the Constitution ?" 2 Story on Const.
559, 560.
This topic is foreign to the subject before us. We shall not
pursue it further.
Congress, in passing the act under consideration, did not 1r-oceed upon this ground. It is not the theory or purpose of the
act to apply the appropriate remedy for such a state of.things.
The constitutionality of the act cannot be sustained under this
section.
This brings us to the examination of the. thirteenth amendment.'
It is as follows:
"Article XIII. Section 1. -Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party
shall' have been .duly convicted, shall exist within the UnitedStates or any place subject to their jurisdi6fion.
"Section 2. Congress shall have power to.enforce this. article.
by appropriate legislation."
Before the adoption of this aniendment, the Constitution; at the
close of the enumeration of the p6wers of Congress, authorized
that body "to make all laws which shall be.necessary ardiproper for carrying into execution the foregoing .powers, and all

UNITED STATES v. RHODES.

other powers vested by this' Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or any department or officer thereof."
In HeGulloch v. Mfaryland, Chief Justice MARSHALL used
the phrase "appropriate" as the equivalent and exponent of
"necessary and proper" in the preceding paragraph. He said:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be withi' the scope of the constitution, and all the means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to the end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and -spirit of the constitution, are constitu* * "To use one" (a bank) "must be within the
tional."
discretion of Congress, if it be an appropriatemode of executing
"But were its necessity
* *
the powers of government."
less apparent" (the Bank of the United States), "none can deny
its.being an appropriatemeasure ; and if it is, the degree of its
necessity, as has been justly observed, is to be discussed in
another place."
Pursuing the subject, hd added: "Whea the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects
intrusted to- the government, to undertake here to inquire into
the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative
ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power :"
4 Wheat. 421, 422 423.
Judge STORY says : "1In the practical application of governmen, then, the public' functionaries must be left at liberty to'
exercise the powers with which the people, by the cohstitution
and laws, have intrusted them. They must have a wide discretion as to the choice of means and the only limitation upon that
discretion would seem to be that the means are appropriateto
the end; and this must admit of considerable latitude, for the
relation between the action and the end, as has been justly
remarked, is not always so direct and palpable as to strike the
eye of every observer. If the end be legitimate and within the
scope of the constitution, all the means which are appropriate
and which are plainly adapted to that end, and which are nor
prohibited, may be constitutionally employed to carry it into
effect:" 1 Story on Const., § 432.
These passages show the spirit in which the amendment is to
be interpreted, and develop fully the principles to be applied.
Before proceeding further, it will be well to pause and direct
.
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our attention to what has been deemed appropriate in the execution of some of the other powers confided to Congress in like
general terms.
(1). "The power to lay and collect taxes, duties, and imposts."
This includes authority to build custom houses;, to employ
revenue cutters; to appoint the necessary collectors and other
officers; to take bonds for the performance of their duties; to
establish the needful bureaus; to prescribe when, how, and in
what the taxes and duties shall be paid ; to rent or build warehouses for temporary storing purposes; to define all crimes relatifig to the subject in its various ramifications, with their punishment; and to provide for their prosecution.
(2). "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the
several states, and with the Indian tribes."
This carries with it the power to build and maintain light.
houses, piers, ana breakwaters; to employ revenue buttdrs ; to
cause surveys to be made of coasts, rivers, and harbors; to
appoint all necessary officers, at home and abroad ; to prescribe
thdir dvties, fix their terms of office and compensation; and to
define and punish all crimes relating to commerce, within the
sphere of the Constitution :" United States v. Coombs, 12 Peters
72; United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407.
(3). "To establish post-offices and post-roads."
This gives authority to appoint a postmaster-general, and local
postmasters throughout the country ; to. define their duties and
compensation; to cause the mails to be carried by dontract, or
by the servants of the department, to all parts of the -states and
territories of the Union, and to foreign countries, and to punish
crimes relating to. the service, including obstructions to thoseengaged in transporting the mail.while in the performance of
their duty.
The mail penal code. comprises more than fifty
offences. 'All of them rest for their necessary constitutional sanction upon .this power, thus briefly expressed.
(4). "To raise and support armies."
This includes the power to enlist such number of men for such
periods 'and at such rates of compensation as may be deenieA
proper ; to provide all the necessary officers, equipments, and
supplies, and to establish a military academy, where are taught
military and such other sciences and branches of knowledge as
may be deemed expedient, in order to prepare young men for the
military service.

-

a

UNITED STATES v. RHODES.

.245

(5). "1To provide and maintain a navy."
This authorizes the government to buy or build any number of
6team or other ships of war, to man, arm, and otherwise prepare
them for war, and to despatch them to any accessible part of the
globe. Under this power the Naval Academy has been established: United States v. Beavan, 3 Wheat. 390.
These are but a small part of the powers which are incidental
and appropriate to the main powers expressly granted. It is
Utopian to believe that without such constructive powers, the
powers expressed can be so executed as to meet the intentions
of. the framers of the constitution, and. accomplish the objects
for which governments are instituted. The constitution provides
expressly for the exercise of such powers to the full extent that
may be "necessary and proper." No other limitation is imposed.
Without this provision, the same result would have followed.
The means of execution are inherently and inseparably a part of
the power to be executed.
The.*constitution declares that "1the senators and representatives before mentioned, anct the members of the several state
legislatures, and all executivi and judicial officers, both of the
United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath
to support'this constitution." No other oath is required, "yet
he would be charged with insanity who would contend that the
legislature. might not superadd to the oath directed by the constitution such other oath of office as its wisdom might shggest:"
McCulloch v.Maryland, 4 Wheat. 416.
The Bank of the United States, with all its faculties, was sustained because it was " convenient" and If appropriate"- for the
Government in the management of its fiscal affairs- 4 Wheat.
316.
Perhaps no measures of the National' Government have
involved more doubt of their constitutionality -than the acquiBoth were carried
sition of Louisiana and the embargo.
through Congress by those who had been most strenuous for a
Mr. Jefferson thought
strict construction of the constitution.
the former ultra vires, and advised an amendment of the constitution, but expressed a willingness to acquiesce if his friends
should entertain a different opinion: 2 Story on the Const. 160.
The second Bank of the United States was a measure of the
The acquisition of Florida involved
same class of thinkers.
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the same question of constitutional power as. the acquisition of
Louisiana. It was universally acquiesced in, and the constitu.
tional question was not raised.
It is an axiom in our jurisprudence that an act of Congress is
not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless the defect of power
to pass it is so clear as to admit of no doubt. Every doubt is to
be resolved in favor of the validity of the law.
"The opposition between the constitution and the law should
be such, that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their
incompatability with each other :" Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 128.
"The presumption indeed must always be in favor of the validity of laws, if the contrary is not clearly demonstrated :" -ooper

v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 18.
",A remedial power in the constitution is to be construed liberally :" Chiihols v'. Georgia, 2 Dall. 476.
"Perhaps the safest rule of interpretation after all, will be
found to be to look to the natiire and objects of the particular
p6wers, duties, and rights, with all lights and aids of cotem.porary history, and to give to the words of each just such operation and force, consistent with their legitimate meaning, as may
fairly secure and attain the ends proposed :" .Priggv. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Peters 60.
Since the organization of the Supreme Court, but three Acts
of Congress have been pronounced by that body void for unconstitutionality: .31arburyq v. Madison, 1 Cr. 137; Scbtt v. Sand.
ford, 19 How. 393 ; Ex yarte Garland, 4 Wall. 34.
The present effect of the amendment was to abolish slavery
wherever it existed within the jurisdiction of the United States.
In the future it throws its protection over* every one, of every
race, color, and condition, within that jurisdiction, and guards
them against the recurrence of the evil.
The constitution, thus amended, consecrates the entire territory
of the republic to freedom, as well as to. free institutions. The
amendment will continue to perform its function throughout the
expanding domain of the- nation, without limit of time 'or space.
Present possessions and future acquisitions will be alike within
the sphere of its operation. Without any other provision than the
1st section of the amendment, Congress would have had authority
to give full effect to the abolition of slavery thereby decreed.
It would have been competent to put in requisition the execu.
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five and judicial, as well as the legislative power, with all the
energy needful for that purpose. The 2d section of the amendment was added out of abundant caution. It authorizes Congress
to select, from time to time, the means that might be deemed
appropriate to the end. It employs a phrase which had been
enlightened by well-considered judicial application. Any exercise of legislative power within its limits involves a legislative,
and not a judicial question. It is only when the authority given
has been clearly exceeded that the judicial power can be invoked.
Its office, then, is to repress and annul the excess; beyond that,
I
it is powerless.
We will now proceed to consider the state of things which
existed before, and at the time the amendment was adopted, the
mischiefs complained of or apprehended, and the remedy intended
to be provided ,for existing and anticipated evils.
When the late civil war broke out, slavery of the African race
existed in fifteen states of the Union.. Thb legal code relating
to persons in that condition was everywhere harsh and severe.
An eminent writer said: " They cannot take property by descent
or purchase; and all they find. and all they own belongs to their
master. They cannot make contracts, and they are deprived of
civil rights. They are assets for the payment. of debts, and cannot
be emancipated by will or otherwise to the prejudice of creditors:"
2 Kent's Com- 281, 282. In a note it is added: "In Georgia,
by an Act of 1829, no -person is permitted to teach a slave, a
negro, or a free person of color to read or write. So in Virginia,
by a statute of 1830, meetings of free negroes to learn reading
or Writing are unlawful, and subject them to corporeal punishment; and it is unlawful for white persons'to assemble with free
negroes or slaves to teach them to read or write. The prohibitory
act of the legislature of Alabama, passed at the session of 1831-2,
relative to the instruction to be given to the slaves or free colored
population, or exhortation or preaching to them, or any mischievous influence attempted to be exerted over them, is sufficiently penal. Laws of similar import are presumed to exist in
the other slave-holding states, but in Louisiana the law on the
subject is armed with ten-fold severity. It not only forbids any
person teaching slaves to read or write, but it declares that any
person using language in any public discourse from the bar,
bench, stage,*or pulpit, or any other place, or in any private con-
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versation, or making use of any sign or actions having a tendency
to produce discontent among the free colored population or insub
ordination among the slaves; or who shall be knowingly instru
mental in bringing into the state any paper, book, or pamphlet
having a like tendency, shall, on conviction, be punishable with
imprisonment or death, at the discretion of the court."
Slaves were imperfectly, if at all, protected from the grossest
outrages by the whites. Justice was no4 for them. The charities and rights of the domestic relations had no legal existence
among them. The shadow of the evil fell upon the free blacks.
They had but few civil aid no political rights in the slave states.
Many of the badges of the bondman's degradation were fastened
upon them. Their condition, like his, though not so bad, was
helpless and hopeless. This is borne out by the passages we have
given from .Kent's Commentaries.
Further research would
darken the picture. The states had always claimed and exercised the exclusive right to fix the status of all persons living
%ithin their jurisdiction.
On the 1st of January 1863 President Lincoln issued his proclamation of emancipation.
Missouri and Maryland abolished
glavery by.their own voluntary action. Throughout the "war the
-African race had evinced entire sympathy with the Union cause.
At the close of the rebellion two hundred thousand had become
soldiers in the Union armies. The race had strong -claims upon
the justice and generosity of the nation. Weighty considerations
of policy, humanity, and right were superadded.
Slavery, in
fact, still existed in thirteen states. Its simple abolition, leaving these laws and this exclusive power of the states over the
emancipated in force, would have been a phantom of. delusion.
The hostility of the dominant class would have been animated
with new ardor. Legislative oppression would have been increased
in severity. Under the guise of police and other regulations,
slavery would have been in effect restored, perhaps In a worse
form, and the gift of freedom would have teen a curse instead of
a blessing to those iniended to be benefited. They would have
had no longer the protection which the instinct of property leads
its possessor to give in whatever form the property may exist.
It was to guard against such evils that the second section of the
amendment was framed. It was intendea to give expressly to
Congress the requisite authority, and to leave no room for do4bt
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or cavil upon the subject. The results have shown the wisdom
of this forecast. Almost simultaneously with the adoption of the
amendment this course of legislative oppression was begun.
Hence, doubtless, the passage of the act under consideration.
In the presence of these facts, who will say it is not an "appro
priate" means of carrying out the object of the first section of
the amendment, and a necessary and proper execution of the
power conferred by the second ? Blot out this act, and deny
the constitutional power to pass it, and the worst effects of
slavery might speedily follow. It wofild be a virtual abrogation
of the amendment.
It would be a remarkable anomaly if the national government,
without this amendment, could confer citizenship on aliens of
every race or color, and citizenship, with civil and political rights,
on the "inhabitants" of Louisiana and Florida, without reference
to race or color, and cannot, with the help of the amendment, confer on those of the African race, who have been born and always
lived within the United States, all that this law seeks to give
them.
It was passed by the Congress succeeding the one which proposed the amendment. Many of the members of both houses were
the same.
This fact is not without weight and signifiiance: Mculloh v.
Mary/land, 4 Wheat. 401.
The amendment reversed and annulled the original policy of
the constitution, which left it to each state to decide exclusively
for itself whether slavery should or should not exist as a local
institution, and what disabilities should attach to those of tle
servile race within its limits. The whites needed no relief or protection, and they are practically unaffected by the amendment.
The emancipation which it wrought was an act of great national
grace, and was doubtless intended to reach further in its e.ffects,
as to every one within its scope, than the consequences of manumission by a private individual.
We entertain no doubt of the constitutionality of the act in all
its provisions.
It gives only certain civil rights. Whether it was competent
for Congress to confer political rights also, involves a different
inquiry. We have not found it necessary to consider the subject.
We are not unmindful of the opinion of the Court of Appeals

